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SINGAPORE’S MOTOR VEHICLE POLICY: REVIEW OF 
RECENT CHANGES AND A SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE 
SOCK-YONG PHANG 
Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, Kent Ridge, Singapore 0511 
(Received 7 February 1992; in revisedform 20 December 1992) 
Abstract-This paper reviews recent developments in motor vehicle policy in Singapore, viz. the motor 
vehicle quota and weekend car schemes as well as regulations on cars entering and leaving Singapore. 
The adoption of a vehicle quota system over and above tax restraints on car ownership has made the job 
of the planner easier but has resulted in a great deal of price uncertainty in the motor vehicle market. 
The attendant result of price uncertainty has been speculation or rent seeking, necessitating several 
adjustments to the rules for the vehicle quota scheme in an attempt to counter speculation. This paper 
proposes that the object of bidding should be changed from that of a right to purchase a new car to that 
of a car ownership right. This will eradicate the problem of speculation as well as problems faced by 
firms in the motor vehicle distribution industry arising from the implementation of the current quota 
system. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Singapore is a densely populated city with an average 
population density of 5000 persons per square kilo- 
metre.’ It is an island republic, which is linked to the 
Malaysian peninsula via a causeway. Singapore had 
a gross national product (GNP) per capita of 
U.S.S11,160 in 1990.’ Although this is one of 
the highest incomes in Asia, less than 40% of 
Singaporean households belong to the car-owning 
category. This is in contrast to over 60% of all 
households in the United Kingdom (GNP per capita 
of U.S.$16,100) and nearly 90% of households in 
the United States (GNP per capita of U.S.$21,790),’ 
although the small land area of Singapore does ef- 
face this contrast to some extent. Urban traffic con- 
gestion, however, is not a serious problem in Singa- 
pore as it has been kept under control since the 
mid-1970s by draconian measures with regard to 
both car ownership and usage. Roads in Singapore 
are relatively congestion free, with peak hour travel- 
ling speeds in the central area averaging 30 kilo- 
metres per hour. This compares favourably with 
peak hour speeds ranging from 10 to 12 kilometres 
per hour in New York, Manila, Lagos, Calcutta and 
London. Traffic congestion avoidance has been ac- 
corded high priority by the Singapore government in 
order that the city state may continue to be an attrac- 
‘In 1990, Singapore had a population of 3 million peo- 
ple and a land area of 633 square kilometres. 
‘In 1991, the GNP per capita for Singapore was 
SS22,867 or U.S.Sl3.236, based on the 1991 exchange rate 
of SS1.73 to U.S. Sl. There were 286,758 registered motor 
cars in 1990. 
?he income figures are for 1990 and are obtained from 
the World Development Report 1992 (World Bank, 1992); 
the car ownership rates for the U.K. and U.S. are from 
Hey (1992, p. 102). 
tive destination for tourists and conventions, as well 
as foreign investment. Section 2 describes the salient 
features of Singapore’s urban transport policy be- 
tween 1970 and 1990 in relation to economic growth. 
Sections 3 and 4 focus on two recent developments 
in motor vehicle policy, viz. the motor vehicle quota 
and weekend car schemes, respectively. In addition, 
I have also taken the opportunity to review a related 
topic in Section 5 -the existing regulations on cars 
entering and leaving Singapore. Section 6 proposes 
changes to the motor vehicle quota system that will 
eradicate speculation. The final section provides con- 
cluding observations. 
2. TRANSPORTATION POLICIES IN SINGAPORE 
Singapore attained self government from the Brit- 
ish in 1959, joined the Federation of Malaysia in 
1963, and left the Federation to become an indepen- 
dent city state in 1965. During the politically trau- 
matic 196Os, issues of employment creation and ade- 
quate housing provision were of greater policy 
concern. The public transport system was operated 
(rather chaotically) by 12 private bus companies, in- 
vestment in public roads was meagre and policies 
regarding car ownership and usage were nonexistent 
(Rimmer, 1986). 
Singapore’s efforts at attracting foreign invest- 
ment for industrialization met with great success 
with regard to the main objectives of employment 
and income creation. Full employment was attained 
by the early 1970s and the average annual growth 
rate in real per capita GNP between 1965 and 1990 
was an impressive 6.5%. Given Singapore’s small 
land area (633 square kilometres), the rapid increase 
in income, with its attendant effect on car ownership 
demand, has necessitated draconian measures to 
curb car ownership demand and use. As part of the 
strategy to alleviate congestion, road taxes and regis- 
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Table 1. Taxes on motor cars in Singapore, 1970 to 1990 
1968 Ott 72 Jan 14 Mar 75 Dee 75 Feb 80 Ott 83 Ott 84 Nov 88 
Ott 72 Dee 73 Mar 75 Dee 75 Feb 80 Ott 83 Ott 84 Nov 88 Nov 90 
import duty (070) 30 45 45 
Registration Fee (S$) 15 15 15 
Additional 
Registration Fee 15 25 55 
(070 of market value) 
Annual Road Tax 
(cents per cc) 
-up to 1000 cc 10 10 14 
-lOOOto 1600~~ 10 12 15 
- 1601 to 2000 cc 10 15 22 
-2001 to 3000 cc 10 20 25 
-above 3000 cc 10 30 60 












35 40 52 60 70 
40 50 65 75 90 
45 60 78 90 105 
50 70 91 105 125 













Source: Registry of Vehicles, Singapore, Ann& Reporr, various years. 
tration fees for private cars were progressively in- 
creased in order to discourage car ownership. The 
world’s first road pricing scheme was introduced in 
1975, and the government allocated large sums to 
the improvement of public transport as well as in- 
vestments in roads. 
Until May 1990, car ownership measures in Singa- 
pore took the form of fiscal restraints. (It should be 
noted that there is no domestic motor vehicle manu- 
facturing industry in Singapore.) Taxes on cars in- 
clude an import tax of 45070, a lump sum registration 
fee, an additional registration fee which is calculated 
as a percentage of the import price of a vehicle, as 
well as annual road taxes which are based on vehicle 
capacity. As a result of the high tax rates, many car 
models are imported without “frills” such as antilock 
brakes and airbags, as the additional costs are tas- 
able as well. “Necessities” such as air conditioners 
and audio systems are installed locally. The rapid 
increases in the additional registration fee and road 
tax rates in the 1970s and 1980s are shown in Table 
1. In 1989, the purchaser of an average 1600 cc car 
paid import taxes of 45O;o and S$lOOO in registration 
fees as well as an additional registration fee, which 
was 175% of the open market value of the car. In 
addition, annual road taxes would amount to S$l500 
at 90 cents per cc.’ There was a large rebate on the 
additional registration fee if a car of not more than 
ten years of age was scrapped upon registration of a 
new car.’ In May 1990, with the introduction of a 
motor vehicle quota system, a purchaser of a new 
car also has to obtain a valid certificate of entitle- 
ment (this scheme will be discussed in Section 3). 
Table 2 compares the affordability of car owner- 
4Company cars pay double the road tax rates given in 
Table 1. 
‘A buyer of a new car who scraps a used car that is less 
than or equal fo ten years of age pays a preferential addi- 
tional registration fee. See Phang (1992), chapter 8, for 
analysis of the effects of the preferential additional registra- 
tion fee scheme. 
ship with that of housing ownership in Singapore. 
While public housing is subsidized in Singapore, and 
87% of the population reside in public housing 
(Phang, 1992). car ownership is heavily taxed. The 
result is a situation where the prices of housing and 
cars differ greatly from the prices that would have 
prevailed had there been no government intervention 
in these markets. In 1991, a 99 year lease for a 4 
room Housing and Development Board flat cost 2.29 
years of an average Singaporean’s income (the ratio 
is even lower if household income is used instead); a 
Toyota Corona (1600 cc), however, would have cost 
3.65 years of income. Table 2 also shows the in- 
creased affordability of cars between 1981 and 1986 
(and up to 1990 when the quota scheme was imple- 
mented, there being no change in the Additional 
Registration Fee over this period). With the imple- 
mentation of the quota scheme in 1990, however, car 
ownership has again become less affordable. 
In 1975, Singapore initiated a crude road pricing 
scheme-the Area Licensing Scheme- to reduce con- 
gestion in the central area during the morning peak 
hours between 7:30 am and 10: I5 am (Holland and 
Watson, 1978). Cars (including taxis) carrying fewer 
than four persons entering the restricted central area 
were required to pay a fee. Buses, motorcycles and 
goods vehicles were exempted from paying any fees. 
The daily fee for private cars was $3 from June to 
December 1975. It was raised to $4 in January 1976 
and to $5 in March 1980. The daily fee was reduced 
to $3 in 1989 when the scheme was extended to the 
evening peak period (4:30 to 6:30 pm); however, ex- 
emptions were removed for car pools, motorcycles 
and goods vehicles. The monthly fees are 20 times 
the daily fee and company cars pay double the rate 
of private cars. Since 1989, motorcyclists pay $1 
daily or $20 for a monthly license to enter the re- 
stricted zone during its hours of operation. The gov- 
ernment has plans to introduce an electronic road 
pricing scheme by 1996. In the meantime, the Com- 
munications Ministry is studying the possibility of 
introducing the area licensing scheme to other con- 
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Prices for New 
4-Room 
HDB Toyota 
Flat (2) Corona 
Affordability Indices (3) 
Housing Car 
Price to Price to 
Income Ratio Income Ratio 
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gested roads on the island (The Straits Times, 20 
1971 2761 12,500 9900 4.53 3.59 
1976 5231 17,500 21,990 3.35 4.20 
1981 9869 24,300 31,222 2.46 3.16 
1986 13,461 31,500 36,521 2.34 2.71 
1991 20,03 1 45,800 73,014 J.29 3.65 
Notes: Prices and income figures are in nominal Singapore dollars. 
1. Indigenous GNP excludes income which accrues to foreign workers and 
foreign enterpreneurs who are residents of Singapore. 
2. HDB flat refers to housing sold by the Housing and Development Board. 
In 1991, 87% of Singaporeans resided in public housing. 
3. Housing price = minimum price for 4-room HDB flat in New Town loca- 
tion; Car price = price for new Toyota Corona, Price to income ratios = price/ 
per capita indigenous GNP. 
Sources of data: Department of Statistics, Yeurbook of Sfutistics, Singupore, 
various years; Housing and Development Board; Automobile Association of Sin- 
gapore, The Highway, various issues. 
August 1992, Singapore Press Holdings). 
A major program of public investment in roads, 
expressways and public transportation was imple- 
mented in the 1980s. Major arterial roads increased 
from 280 km in 1979 to 512 km by 1989, while ex- 
pressways increased from 28 km to 102 km over the 
same period. The 2.4 km Central Expressway Tunnel 
was completed in 1991 at a cost of S$350 million; 
this tunnel has reduced travel times to the central 
area considerably. A 15 km road tunnel circling the 
city and estimated to cost S$4 billion is presently on 
the drawing board. Public sector investment in pub- 
lic transport took the form of a 66 km Mass Rapid 
Transit (MRT) system comprising 44 stations. The 
system, costing S$5 billion, was partially in use by 
1987, and was completed in 1990. The government 
has budgeted another Ss4.3 billion to be spent over 
the next five years (between April 1992 and March 
1997) on road works, extensions to the MRT system 
and the electronic road pricing system.’ 
Despite exorbitant car taxes and improvements in 
public transportation, car ownership continued to 
increase. The number of motor cars registered in- 
creased from 165,500 in 1980 to 271,200 in 1989. 
The number of persons per private motor car de- 
creased from 15.8 to 10.0 over the same period. 
Growth in motor vehicle ownership was slower dur- 
ing the recession in the mid-1980s. However, the 
rapid increase in car ownership in the late 1980s 
bThis was announced by the Prime Minister in his Na- 
tional Day Rally speech in August 1992. In his speech, the 
Prime Minister stated, “I want fo meet the aspirations of 
car owners but there is a limit to the numbers because Sin- 
gapore is such a small country. But do not be discouraged. 
There is scope for more cars on our roads. We will build 
more bypasses, underpasses, overpasses, roads, tunnels; 
whatever passes you need we will build for you.” The Srruifs 
Times, 17 August 1992, p. 22 (Singapore Press Holdings). 
prompted a major review of land transportation pol- 
icy. A Selected Committee on Land Transportation 
Policy was appointed by Parliament in 1989 to re- 
view land transport policies. In January 1990, the 
Committee proposed a quota system for motor vehi- 
cles as well as a weekend car scheme (Select Commit- 
tee on Land Transportation Policy, 1990). These two 
proposals were adopted (with slight modifications) 
by the government and will be reviewed in the next 
two sections. 
3. THE MOTOR VEHICLE QUOTA SCHEME 
The adoption of a motor vehicle quota scheme in 
May 1990 was formally announced by the Minister 
for Communications on 31 January 1990. Under the 
quota scheme, a buyer of a new vehicle must possess 
a certificate of entitlement (COE) which may be ob- 
tained in a public tender held by the Registry of Vehi- 
cles (ROV). The COE is valid for a period of ten 
years. Owners of cars older than ten years must pay 
the prevailing average quota premium.’ Owners of 
vehicles older than ten years at the time of implemen- 
tation of the scheme were given a grace period of two 
years before they were required to pay the prevailing 
average quota premium if they chose not to deregis- 
ter the car. At the time of announcement (as an in- 
terim measure to prevent a rush to purchase cars 
pending actual implementation of the quota) the reg- 
istration fee was increased from $1000 to $6000 for 
private cars. This interim increase was removed when 
the scheme came into operation in May 1990. 
The scheme as it stood in May 1990 took the fol- 
lowing form: the growth rate of motor vehicles each 
year would be directly determined by the government 
and would be based on the increase in road capacity. 
‘This is the average of quota premiums over the past 
twelve months. 
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Tenders would be held every three months for six 
categories of vehicles: (a) cars of 1000 cc or less; (b) 
cars of 1001 to 1600 cc as well as taxis; (c) cars of 
1601 to 2000 cc; (d) cars of 2001 cc or more; (e) 
goods vehicles and private buses; and (f) motorcy- 
cles. A seventh category of licences known as “Open” 
licenses, could be used to purchase any kind of vehi- 
cle. Successful individual bidders would pay the low- 
est successful bid price in each category. Successful 
bidders for company cars and heavy goods vehicles 
would pay double the quota premium. An open cate- 
gory licence could be converted to a motorcycle li- 
cence for one third the quota premium. The stated 
rationale for adopting separate categories was that 
this would protect motorcyclists and small car buyers 
from being outbid by richer buyers of bigger cars. 
To discourage speculation in car licenses, individ- 
ual bidders could only submit one application in each 
tender exercise. Firms could make any number of 
bids, while authorized motor distributors were al- 
lowed 100 bids each. Each bid had to be accompa- 
nied by a cashier’s cheque equal to half the bid. A 
temporary certificate of entitlement (TCOE) was is- 
sued to successful bidders who had to use it to regis- 
ter a new vehicle within six months of receiving it. 
The TCOEs issued to individuals and car distributors 
were allowed to be transferred once during the six 
month period of validity for a transfer fee of S$lO. 
Firms were not allowed to sell their temporary li- 
censes. 
Within two months of operation of the scheme, 
complaints from the public regarding speculation in 
TCOEs and profiteering by car distributors resulted 
in changes to the original rules. From July 1990, bids 
for COEs were held monthly instead of once in three 
months and the validity of TCOEs was shortened to 
three months instead of the previous six in the May 
tender. Motor vehicle distributors were entitled to 30 
instead of 100 bids in each tender, and their TCOEs 
could only be sold to their own customers. 
The above changes to the rules did not, however, 
solve the problem of speculation in TCOEs, al- 
though prices did fall during the period of the Gulf 
crisis (see Table 3 and Fig. 1). Between May 1990 
and July 1992, more than 80?708 of new vehicles were 
registered using TCOEs which had been purchased in 
the secondary market. The perception of the general 
public that speculative activity and the “hoarding” 
of TCOEs by car dealers were responsible for driving 
up prices after the Gulf War resulted in another 
change in rules. TCOEs were made nontransferable 
for a one year trial period beginning on 1 September 
1991.‘) Nontransferable TCOEs would be valid for a 
six month period. TCOEs for goods vehicles, buses 
and vehicles in the Open category remain transfer- 
able and continue to be valid for three months only. 
‘See Government Parliamentary Committee (Communi- 
cations) (1991). 
91n August 1992, the government announced that the 
trial period would be extended pending a review of the 
motor vehicle quota system. 
Motor distributors are not allowed to participate in 
the tender and all potential buyers of new cars must 
submit their own bids. 
The above changes have not, however, dampened 
prices of COEs. Besides the underlying demand for 
car ownership, fluctuations in premiums during the 
past year have also originated from policy changes. 
Premiums during the first half of 1992 for nontrans- 
ferable COEs were at an all time high (see Table 3 
and Fig. 1). A number of factors other than increases 
in income were at work to drive up COE prices. 
First, the two year grace period given to owners of 
cars older than ten years at the time of implementa- 
tion of the scheme came to an end in May 1992. In 
March 1992, 17,000 owners of vehicles more than 10 
years old had not paid the prevailing quota premium. 
Faced with the choice between paying the premium 
to keep their vehicles and deregistering their vehicles, 
most chose the latter. A massive scrapping of 10,000 
old vehicles took place in April. This resulted in a 
one time increase in demand for new cars; however 
the quota numbers were not raised during the first 
half of the year to accommodate the increased de- 
mand. The government has since promised that 
10,000 extra COEs would be added to the original 
quota numbers by year end. 
Second, a stricter emission ruling for new cars 
took effect on 1 July 1992, necessitating most new 
cars to be fitted with catalytic converters. In the 
months leading to July, car traders were exceedingly 
concerned with clearing their inventories of new cars 
which were not fitted with catalytic converters (and 
that would otherwise have had to be re-exported 
come 1 July). On the demand side, car buyers who 
did not wish to purchase a car fitted with a catalytic 
converter attempted to obtain COEs in order to reg- 
ister their cars before 1 July 1992. 
Third, the certificate of entitlement to own a car, 
from the perspective of motor vehicle distributors, is 
a certificate to sell a car. Under the quota scheme, 
car dealers have also turned price strategists in order 
to ensure a market share of COEs fo sell cars.” Each 
month, larger firms commit millions of dollars to 
participating in the auction. Although technically 
barred from participating in tenders under the non- 
transferability of COE rule, car distributors continue 
to submit bids on behalf of their customers.” Many 
‘?he car distribution network in Singapore is domi- 
nated by four dealers for the most popular cars. These are 
Borneo Motors for Toyota, Tan Chong and Sons Motors 
for Nissan, Kah Motor Company for Honda, and Cycle 
and Carriage Industries for Mitsubishi, Mercedes Benz and 
the Proton Saga. The abovementioned cars comprised 68% 
of all cars in Singapore in 1988. 
"A potential new car buyer might be requested by the 
salesperson not to enter a price on the COE form. The car 
distributor subsequently fills in the offer price on behalf of 
the customer and submits it to the Registry of Vehicles. 
The buyer is, instead, offered a fixed price regardless of 
the outcome of the bidding. A wrong price forecast by the 
car dealer could either mean unexpected losses (or gains) 
for the firm or disappointed customers who are unsuccess- 
ful in obtaining TCOEs. 
Singapore’s motor vehicle policy 
Table 3. Premiums for motor vehicle certificates of entitlement (Singapore S) 
May 1990 to September 1992 
CATEGORY 
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TENDER IN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
May 90 1004 3022 5001 
Tenders held monthly instead of quarterly 
Aug 90 3080 6012 7238 
Sep 90 5030 9888 11104 
Ott 90 5612 7220 10400 
ARF reduced from 175 percent to 160 percent 
Nov 90 3102 2004 1120 
Dee 90 2001 3202 4000 
Jan 91 2006 3224 3600 
ARF reduced from 160 percent to 150 percent 
Feb 91 210 2649 
Mar 91 652 909 
Apr 91 1202 1804 
May 91 4510 5258 
Jun 91 7002 7875 
Jul91 7004 8002 
Aug 91 9660 9040 
Sep 91 9508 10520 
TCOEs made non-transferable 
3001 988 102 122 2508 
210 1004 56 100 988 
1402 800 1 122 1630 
5610 3020 112 310 6062 
11020 IO000 1820 410 9012 
9178 12047 1510 430 11171 
12558 12742 3886 610 12368 
13080 13000 6002 690 12488 
Ott 91 6300 6528 10002 I2002 
Nov 91 7500 9100 12002 13004 
Dee 91 9616 12958 14800 16788 
Jan 92 10100 16602 18500 19666 
Feb 92 9002 11000 20002 15080 
Mar 92 12160 10406 16100 17600 
Apr 92 15000 14958 19739 20037 
May 92 17300 20542 24798 25108 
Jun 92 17200 20500 30002 32898 
Jul92 13690 I8994 24758 24828 
Aug 92 13060 19510 20998 21008 
Sep 92 15004 20741 24118 1500 
528 I 152 3316 
4550 1018 320 7750 
5602 2002 400 7400 
5886 1502 80 11100 
1502 530 200 5002 
2002 312 180 3170 












24 12222 1110 
24 14337 3002 
1 16738 6868 
1 18080 11457 
1 18104 13837 
1 18587 14048 
1 20288 14972 
1 25002 15834 
1 31888 11008 
1 23870 8302 
I 24018 11002 






Category 1: small cars (1000 cc or less) 
Category 2: medium cars (1001 to 1600 cc) 
Category 3: big cars (1601 to 2000 cc) 
Category 4: luxury cars (2001 cc and above) 
Category 5: goods vehicles & private buses 
Category 6: motorcycles 
Category 7: Open 
Category 8: Weekend cars 
Source: The Sfrairs Tmes (various dates), Singapore Press Holdings, Singapore. 
of the dealers have performed the role of stabilizing 
prices, despite large changes in quota premiums, by 
offering car buyers fixed prices or “discounts” on 
COE premiums as part of their pricing strategy. Car 
dealers also bid through proxies and then arrange 
for the transfer of car ownership within the first few 
days of registration (this is known as a “double trans- 
fer” in the trade). Nontransferability of COEs has 
therefore greatly reduced arbitrage efficiency. (A 
transfer fee of 2% of the car’s value is payable when 
policy changes, the competition amongst car distrib- 
utors for market share also contributed to an in- 
crease in premiums, the costs of which are borne by 
both car distributors and car buyers. A solution to 
the problem of speculation in the implementation of 
the motor vehicle quota scheme is proposed in Sec- 
tion 6. 
4. THE WEEKEND CAR SCHEME 
a car changes hands.) Against a backdrop of eco- 
nomic growth and a decrease in the additional regis- On 1 May 1991, Singapore implemented a Week- 
tration fee rateI as well as other factors arising from end Car Scheme which restricted car usage for week- 
end cars; in return, purchasers enjoy tax savings. 
This was in order that the joys of car ownership 
‘*With the implementation of the quota system, the Ad- 
could be extended to a larger-nimber of households 
ditional Registration Fee was reduced from 175% to 160% without fear of increased congestion during peak 
in November 1990 and further reduced to 150% in Febru- hours. A COE is required for the registration of a 
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~ Quota Premiums 
Fig. 1. Quota premiums for medium sized cars (1001 to 1600 cc). 
has been added under the motor vehicle quota system 
(see Table 3). A weekend car is identified by a red 
number plate which is required to be welded onto 
the vehicle and sealed by an authorized inspection 
centre. The penalty for tampering with the number 
plate of a weekend car is a fine equal to twice the 
annual road tax for an equivalent normal car. 
In 1991, the buyer of a weekend car enjoyed tax 
rebates on the registration fee, import duty and COE 
premium, up to a maximum of $15,000. The maxi- 
mum rebate will be reduced by $3000 each year until 
1996, when there is no rebate and the weekend car 
scheme is expected to be superseded by an electronic 
road pricing scheme. The owner of a weekend car 
also enjoys a 70% reduction in road taxes. However, 
weekend cars may only be used on Sundays and pub- 
lic holidays and during off-peak hours (between 7 
pm to 7 am on weekdays, and after 3 pm on Satur- 
days). A day licence is required to be displayed if the 
car is used outside the permitted hours. Five free day 
licences are given for each year and additional ones 
cost $20 each. The penalty for using a weekend car 
outside permitted hours and without a day licence is 
a fine equal to half the annual road tax for an equiv- 
alent normal car for a first offence. For second and 
subsequent offences, the fine is equal to the full an- 
nual road tax for an equivalent normal car. 
Weekend cars may be converted to normal cars 
and vice versa. Normal cars which are converted to 
weekend cars pay only 5% of the road tax but do 
not enjoy any other rebate. Since the inception of 
the scheme, the quota premiums for weekend cars 
have always been greater than the minimum bid of 
$1 (ranging from $1110 to $15, 834), which indicates 
a situation of excess demand for these cars. 
The weekend car scheme was intended to allow a 
greater number of household to own cars without 
contributing to congestion during peak hours. How- 
ever, the scheme has also proved of great benefit to 
multiple car households as well as owners of cars 
with engine capacity greater than 3000 cc. These 
large cars have a road tax rate of $1.75 per cc (see 
Table 1). If the savings in taxes for a weekend car in 
this category is used to purchase daily coupons for 
use throughout the year (costing $5940), net savings 
are still positive.” 
5. MOTOR VEHICLE BORDER CONTROLS 
As part of the package of measures to discourage 
car usage, there exists a 50% ad valorem duty on 
petrol in Singapore. The absence of petrol taxes 
across the causeway in Malaysia has resulted in a 
substantial price differential between petrol pur- 
chased in Singapore and in Malaysia. In April 1989, 
Parliament passed the Customs (Amendment) Act, 
otherwise known as the Half Tank Rule, in order 
that petrol taxes could be more effective in reducing 
car usage. The Act made it an offence for any Singa- 
pore-registered vehicle to leave Singapore without at 
least half a tank of petrol, the objective being to 
discourage motorists from purchasing their petrol 
from across the causeway. Officials from the Cus- 
toms and Excise Department carry out random vi- 
sual checks on fuel gauges of Singapore registered 
vehicles crossing the causeway. Drivers of vehicles 
without the required minimum amount of petrol in 
their tanks are liable to be fined up to a maximum 
of $500. It is an offence to either tamper with a fuel 
gauge or drive a vehicle with a faulty gauge. 
The “Half Tank Rule” was superseded by the 
“Three-Quarter Tank Rule” on 4 February 1991 
when an additional 15 cents per litre tax was levied 
“For a Porsche 911 (3600 cc), the normal annual road 
tax is $6300. The annual rebate on fees (%3@00) and road 
taxes ($4410) for a weekend car add up to $7410, which is 
$1470 in excess of the costs of daily coupons for the year 
($5940). See The Straits Times, 1 August 1991, p. 20 (Singa- 
pore Press Holdings). 
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on leaded petrol in order to encourage motorists to industry. Motor vehicle dealers as well as used car 
switch to unleaded petrol. dealers have become increasingly involved as price 
Foreigners (in particular, Malaysians living across strategists and rent seekers in the quota game. A 
the causeway) who work or live in Singapore are not source of some problems in th: quota scheme is the 
allowed to drive Malaysian-registered cars in Singa- integrating of two markets: the market for car own- 
pore. From 1 January 1992, foreign-registered cars ership and the market for motor vehicles. A simple 
entering Singapore were subject to restraints similar yet fundamental solution would be to separate the 
to those for weekend cars. Foreign-registered cars two markets. This may be done in the following 
are allowed free entry on Sundays and public holi- manner: 
days, between 7 pm and midnight on weekdays and 1. A motor vehicle may only be registered by a 
from 3 pm to midnight on Saturdays,14 as well as on person with a valid ownership licence which is non- 
five random days a year. There is a fee of $20 for transferable. 
each additional day in excess of the five free random 2. A car owner who owns a car with a valid COE 
days. Foreign registered vehicles which enter Singa- or who has paid the prevailing quota premium will 
pore and remain for prolonged periods may, as an be issued a nontransferable ownership licence with a 
alternative, purchase monthly permits of $340. remaining period of validity equal to the remaining 
period of validity of his COE. All other car owners 
6. A PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE MOTOR QUOTA 
will be issued with a nontransferable ownership li- 
VEHICLE SYSTEM 
cence with a period of validity equal to ten minus 
the current age of the car owned. For example, a 
The present motor vehicle quota system has person who owns a one-year-old car will be issued 
proven effective in controlling motor vehicle growth. an ownership licence valid for another nine years. A 
The certainty of prices has, however, been greatly person who has paid the prevailing quota premium a 
undermined as a result. The main advantage, that of year ago will similarly be issued an ownership licence 
certainty of quantity, ought therefore to be weighed valid for another nine years. A person who owns a 
against the uncertainty of prices and attendant spec- six-year-old car (which was first registered before the 
ulative activity which affects many parties, in- quota scheme was implemented) will be issued an 
cluding: ownership licence valid for four years. A person may 
possess more than one car ownership licence. 
1. Those wishing to purchase a new car. 3. Only first time vehicle-owners-to-be and exist- 
2. Car dealers of new cars who are concerned about ing owners whose ownership licences have expired 
market share and who also wish to provide some will be in the market for ownership licences. After 
measure of certainty of prices to their customers. successfully obtaining a licence (that is, submitting a 
3. Used car dealers who at any one time are holding sufficiently high enough bid), the car owner need not 
an inventory of used cars. bid again for a licence until ten years later when the 
4. Those wishing to purchase a used car. licence expires. During the ten year period, he may 
5. Those concerned about the equity implications as change as many cars (new or used) as he wishes to 
well as the effect on prices arising from the actions without having to bid again. 
of speculators or nongenuine car buyers. 4. Bidding may take place in ownership catego- 
Various solutions have been implemented to solve 
ries, viz. cars, motorcycles, buses and lorries. 
the latter problem of speculation. These have in- 
5. Those with a valid ownership licence but who 
cluded holding the auctions more frequently and 
do not wish to register a car due to unexpected events 
making the COEs nontransferable. However, these 
may obtain a partial refund from the ROV. 
measures do not appear to have solved the problem. 
With the above changes, car prices will be stabi- 
Other proposed solutions have included changing the 
lized but the costs of car ownership will fluctuate 
lowest successful bid price auction to that of a pay- 
with the demand for car ownership. The advantages 
as-you-bid auction, as well as increasing the transfer 
of this system would include: (a) an absence of spec- 
fee to a higher percentage of the transacted price of 
ulative activity as no transfers are possible; and (b) 
car dealers and other nongenuine buyers need not be 
a car. 
An alternative solution (not hitherto considered) 
involved in the bidding for licences. 
is proposed here. The fundamental objective of the 
One disadvantage of the system would be that the 
motor vehicle quota system is to control the number 
ROV would need to monitor another aspect of vehi- 
of motor vehicles in Singapore. However, the man- 
cle transactions to ensure that each car (whether new 
ner in which it was implemented has had several un- 
or used) is registered with an owner who has a valid 
desirable effects on the motor vehicle distribution 
ownership licence. 
Another problem may be that a car owner whose 
ownership licence has expired and is unsuccessful in 
“Following appeals from several Johor trade and busi- 
bidding for a new licence will have to sell or deregis- 
ness associations, the Singapore government extended the ter his car. This may create some unhappiness. To 
unrestricted hours of stay here for foreign-registered vehi- overcome this problem, ownership licences, once is- 
cles from midnight to 2 am as of 1 May 1992. sued, may be held for perhaps a period of a year 
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from the date of issue before a vehicle is required to 
be registered. This will enable car owners to plan at 
least one year ahead and bid before their ownership 
licences expire. Alternatively, only first time car 
owners need bid, while existing car owners pay the 
prevailing price. This will reduce the number of li- 
cences to be allocated as well as the number of people 
involved in the bidding. To the extent that first time 
car owners may be those with income or liquidity 
constraints, the lowest successful bid may be less 
than the situation when all existing car owners bid at 
ten year intervals. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The success of vehicle usage restraints in reducing 
road congestion in Singapore has been aided by mea- 
sures to curb car ownership. With a limited land 
area, the magnitude of road prices is necessarily de- 
pendent on the underlying demand for road use 
which, in turn, is determined by the absolute number 
of vehicles. The adoption of a vehicle quota system 
over and above tax restraints on car ownership has 
provided the planner with certainty of numbers, 
whilst simultaneously generating a great deal of price 
uncertainty in the motor vehicle market. The atten- 
dant result of price uncertainty has been speculation 
or rent seeking, necessitating additional resource 
costs to monitor such behavior. The Singapore gov- 
ernment has been exceedingly flexible in the imple- 
mentation of the innovative motor vehicle quota 
scheme, and has been willing to resolve problems as 
they arise through changes in the rules of the scheme. 
The move to make TCOEs nontransferable, how- 
ever, has not solved the problem of speculation and 
rent seeking but has, instead, resulted in arbitrage 
efficiency losses. The proposal to change the object 
of bidding from that of a right to purchase a new 
car to that of a car ownership right will eradicate the 
problem of speculation, as well as problems faced 
by firms in the car distribution industry. 
The weekend car scheme represents an innovative 
means by which the car ownership rate can be in- 
creased without increasing peak hour congestion. 
The success of Singapore’s vehicle restraints is also 
due in no small measure to improved public trans- 
portation as well as to the country’s relative inacces- 
sibility to foreign registered vehicles (except via the 
causeway), which makes it easy to monitor vehicles 
entering and leaving Singapore. The ease of imple- 
menting and enforcing the “Three-Quarter Tank 
Rule” as well as the restraints on foreign registered 
(mainly Malaysian) vehicles serve to illustrate this 
latter point. 
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